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how much workers are paid. Exposing workers to a compensation scheme based on random
bonuses makes them cheat more but has no eect on their productivity. We also nd that
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1 Introduction
A vast body of evidence shows that cheating, fraud and crime are pervasive in the workplace.1
In this paper, we investigate how pay structures and worker productivity interact with workplace
cheating. We focus on two specic questions. First, how does the uncertainty inherent in bonus-
based compensation schemes inuence the amount of employee dishonesty? Second, is there a
link between workers' productivity and how much they cheat?
1.1 Summary of experimental design and ndings
To study these questions, we conducted an online experiment using the computerized real-eort
`slider task' (Gill and Prowse, 2012) that involves moving sliders across a screen. To start with,
subjects were paid to complete a certain amount of the task. In the control, the subjects were
paid a xed amount, either $2 or $8, for completing the work. In the bonus treatment, subjects
were paid $2 for sure for completing the work, but with 50% probability were also paid a bonus
of an additional $6. Notice that the two-point distribution of remuneration was therefore held
constant across the control and the bonus treatment. In a subsequent stage, all subjects worked
under a common piece rate, and simultaneously were given an opportunity to cheat: we asked the
subjects to report the last digit of their best friend's phone number and paid them an amount in
pounds equal to the number that they reported. The design allows us to identify the causal eect
of the random component of bonuses on later cheating and productivity, and also to determine
whether there is a relationship between working harder and cheating more. The experimental
nature of our design gives us the control necessary to identify cleanly causal eects and to measure
accurately changes in productivity and cheating.
We nd three main results. First, the use of random bonuses increases cheating but has no
eect on productivity. Subjects who have been exposed to the bonus-based compensation scheme
are more likely to behave dishonestly by inating the number that they report: using random
bonuses increases the average report by 5% and increases the proportion of subjects reporting a 7
or higher by 9%. This result suggests that the uncertainty inherent in bonus-based compensation
may have important unintended side eects that rms ought to take into account when designing
their human resource policies. Second, receiving a random bonus has no eect on cheating or
productivity: within the subjects exposed to bonus-based system, those who received the bonus
cheat to the same extent and work as hard as those subjects who did not receive the bonus.
Third, across our whole sample more productive subjects also cheat more: our regression results
indicate that the hardest-working subjects report a number 22% higher than that reported by
the least hard-working, while the most productive are 43% more likely to report a 7 or higher.
Although not the main focus of our paper, we also nd that males cheat more: on average males
report a number 7% higher than that reported by females.2
1We survey some of the evidence in Section 1.2.
2Dreber and Johannesson (2008), Conrads et al. (2013) and Houser et al. (2012) also nd that males behave
more dishonestly. Erat and Gneezy (2012) replicate the nding for lies that are costly to others, but nd the
opposite result for `altruistic white lies' that benet others but hurt the liar.
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1.2 Relevance of our set-up to labor markets
Our set-up is relevant to labor markets for three main reasons: rst, workers have many oppor-
tunities to cheat their employers; second, our methodology for measuring cheating allows what
we call `soft' as well as `hard' cheating, both of which are important in labor markets; and third,
rms commonly use bonus-based compensation that involves an important random component.
First, employee cheating and crime is an enormous and pervasive problem for rms and the
economy. The Association of Certied Examiners estimates that the typical rm loses about 5%
of revenues to occupational fraud, which translates into a loss of $3.5 trillion at the global level
(ACFE, 2012). Dickens et al. (1989) survey the evidence, reporting that 5% to 30% of business
failures in the US result from the cost of employee theft, while nding \overwhelming empirical
evidence that rms expend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance." Jacob
and Levitt (2003) nd evidence of teachers cheating on standardized test scores in about 5% of
classrooms annually. Employees can cheat their employers in a wide variety of ways. Grover
(1993) summarizes many of the ways in which employees can lie in their reports (self-reporting
of hours worked, for instance, is common in professional services such as auditing, consultancy
and the law).3 Other forms of cheating include: payroll fraud; falsifying revenue gures; false or
inated invoicing; false expense claims; cash skimming; check tampering; theft of inventory or
telephone services; customer identity theft; and theft of intellectual property.
Second, our methodology for measuring cheating provides an opportunity for what we call
`soft' and `hard' cheating. By hard cheating we mean a subject who cheats knowingly, that is a
subject who either (i) knows the last digit of her best friend's phone number but reports something
higher or (ii) does not know the last digit but reports a number instead of selecting \don't know".4
By soft cheating we mean a subject who subconsciously deceives herself in a favorable way about
either (i) the identity of her best friend or (ii) the last digit of her best friend's phone number.5
The scope for soft cheating introduced by our novel design mimics the many opportunities for soft
cheating and self-deception in the workplace that might impact the employer. Workers can deceive
3\People have ample opportunity to either lie or tell the truth in the course of their work. Workers continually
report their behavior and give information to peers, superordinates, and others, in written form, orally, and
nonverbally. The truck driver records the number of hours on the road, the nurse charts vital signs, the certied
public accountant states what has been audited, and the forester reports a tree census. Organizations generally
rely on these reports to be honest. However, each of these individuals may have reasons to lie. The truck driver
returns home sooner if he says he drove the speed limit when in fact he exceeded it; the nurse may not have time
to actually observe vital signs that must be recorded; CPA's may gain partner status by exaggerating their work
quantity; and the forester may misreport the tree census to prevent deforestation." (Grover, 1993, p. 478)
4Our methodology for measuring cheating is related to a recent wave of experimental studies that use a report of
a privately-known outcome as an indicator of cheating or dishonesty. These papers use a `hard' form of cheating or
deception, where subjects report the outcome of a coin ip (Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011; Houser et al., 2012; Abeler
et al., 2012), a die roll (Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008; Lammers et al., 2010; Conrads et al., 2013; Fischbacher and
Utikal, 2011; Hao and Houser, 2011; Shalvi et al., 2011; Suri et al., 2011; Cojoc and Stoian, 2012; Lewis et al.,
2012; Shalvi et al., forthcoming) or some other random variable (Coricelli et al., 2010; Eisenkopf et al., 2011).
Some studies ask subjects to report their score on a task (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Cadsby et al., 2010; Schwieren
and Weichselbaumer, 2010). There is also a literature on strategic sender-receiver games in which a sender can
report the outcome of a random variable truthfully or lie (e.g., Charness and Garoupa, 2000; Lundquist et al.,
2009; Wang et al., 2010), and on lying in games more generally (e.g., Croson et al., 2003; Gneezy, 2005; Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006).
5Our methodology cannot measure the relative weight of hard and soft cheating: we leave it to future research
to try to disentangle their relative importance.
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themselves on a number of dimensions, including for example: their personal contribution to team
success (especially if they are a team leader deciding on individual bonuses); their perception of
the quality of junior colleagues (who might not be promoted) or job candidates who might become
future competitors (who might not be hired); the extent to which double-billing of time can be
justied in professions where clients are billed for self-reported and unveriable hours; whether
they are ill enough to justify taking a paid sick day; and whether it is justied to take oce
equipment for personal use and make personal phone calls at work.6
Third, rms often use bonus-based compensation plans that, from the perspective of the
worker, contain a component that is unrelated to individual performance, but instead depends
on factors that are beyond the worker's control. Compensation based on the performance of
the entire rm or a subgroup of employees is one source of such uncertainty. Examples include
discretionary group bonuses, stock options and rm-wide prot-sharing plans. The use of stock
option plans for non-executive employees is widespread and growing (Core and Guay, 2001), and
non-executives receive over 60% of stock options granted by value (Oyer and Schaefer, 2005). For
executives, too, stock options are becoming a more important part of total pay (Hall and Liebman,
1998), and even though CEOs impact rm performance directly, luck also plays an important role
in how they are paid.7 Group bonuses, where individuals share a bonus based on their group's
performance, are also common, especially in nancial services (see Hansen, 1997, for a case study),
and some successful rms make extensive use of prot-sharing.8 Even when bonuses are based
on individual performance, randomness can play an important role due to measurement error
when evaluating output, especially when evaluations are subjective, and because the underlying
process that translates worker input into measurable output is stochastic.9 Winning a tournament
is essentially equivalent to being paid a bonus, and a large literature looks at the design of optimal
tournaments in the presence of such noise (e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
Of course, we cannot be certain about the extent to which the response to the random bonuses
that we nd in our experimental setting would translate into real-world settings in which bonuses
depend on both individual performance and uncertainty. The advantage of focusing attention
only on the uncertain aspect is that we can identify cleanly the eect of the uncertainty holding
remuneration constant across the control and the random bonus treatment. Future work could
study protably how the performance-based element interacts with the uncertainty in determining
6These opportunities for soft cheating may be greater for workers with more responsibility and discretion. On
average more able workers will tend to hold such positions. In our experiment, it is conceivable that more productive
workers have more friends and thus have greater scope for soft cheating.
7Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) nd that CEO pay responds as much to luck, dened as observable shocks
to performance beyond the rm's control, as it does to performance that is under the rm's control, and that luck
aects salaries and bonuses as well as grants of stock options. One justication is that rms might want to link
CEO compensation to the value of outside opportunities (Oyer, 2004).
8Knez and Simester (2001) provide a brief survey and a case study of a Continental Airlines bonus scheme for
its 35,000 employees based on a rm-wide performance target; see also Bhattacherjee (2005) for a case study of a
bonus scheme based on a rm-wide productivity target for the 15,000 employees of the Indian rm ITC Limited
that makes up about 6% of pay on average.
9Moers (2005) uses administrative data to show how multiple performance measures and subjective evaluation
make it dicult to dierentiate among subordinates; see also Kaur et al. (2011, p. 29-30) for an interesting case
study of randomness due to variation in the quality of equipment in an Indian call center, but there are many other
sources of noise, e.g., luck in whether an important client signs a contract.
3
behavior.
1.3 Novelty and interpretation of our results
Despite their importance, employee cheating and crime have not received much attention by
economists, and their determinants are not well understood. Our paper contributes to a small
yet growing literature that examines the interaction between various compensation schemes and
cheating in the workplace. Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) nd a positive rela-
tionship between CEO compensation based on stock options and nancial misreporting. Curry
and Mongrain (2009) and Gilpatric (2011) study theoretically the incentives to cheat in a rank-
order tournament, where cheating increases both output and the probability of failing an audit.
Experimental subjects have been found to cheat more when competing (Schwieren and Weichsel-
baumer, 2010, compared to when they are paid piece-rate) or when paid for reaching a goal or
target (Schweitzer et al., 2004; Cadsby et al., 2010),10 and subjects report higher die rolls when
paid in teams of two and share the proceeds (Conrads et al., 2013). Finally, Waller and Bishop
(1990) and Chow et al. (1994) consider experimentally how dierent pay schemes aect subordi-
nate managers' communication of private information. However, none of these papers examines
the inuence of bonuses on subsequent productivity and cheating behavior. Furthermore, to the
best of our knowledge we are the rst to analyze whether a link exists between productivity in a
work task and cheating behavior.11
A plausible interpretation of our nding that the level of cheating depends on whether subjects
were exposed to the bonus treatment, but not on whether they actually received the bonus, is that
subjects perceive exposure to the random bonus as unfair, but are not inuenced by outcomes
per se in their perceptions of fairness. Being subject to an unfair payment mechanism provides
a moral justication for negative reciprocity in the form of more dishonesty. This interpretation
is broadly consistent with existing notions of procedural fairness and with a compelling body
of evidence, from both laboratory experiments and eld data, that workers respond negatively
to unfair treatment and bad intentions. Under Trautmann (2009)'s concept of process fairness,
the outcome generating process rather than the actual outcomes inuences fairness perceptions,
while Konow (2003, p. 1230)'s survey notes that \some argue that procedural justice is valued
for itself, independent of outcomes." Charness and Levine (2007) nd experimentally that worker
punishment of an employer is much more sensitive to the component of wages that is under their
employer's control than it is to the component due to luck, concluding that intentions matter
10In Schweitzer et al. (2004) and Cadsby et al. (2010), the opportunity to cheat occurs during the task for
which the bonus is paid and consists in exaggerating one's performance. The emphasis is on whether the nature
of a performance-based bonus scheme induces cheating by providing an opportunity for a small lie about one's
performance to result in a large increase in one's earnings. Instead, we present the same opportunity to cheat in
both the random bonus treatment and the control condition, and the cheating opportunity occurs subsequently.
Thus, perceptions of fairness operate independently of any incentive to hit a target.
11Schweitzer et al. (2004) and Cadsby et al. (2010) nd that subjects who are closer to reaching a goal or target
are more likely to cheat. In a setting where subjects were able to cheat to help them solve mazes and in reporting
how many were solved, Schwieren and Weichselbaumer (2010) nd that subjects who solved few mazes increased
the amount they cheated when they competed instead of being paid piece-rate, while those who solved many mazes
did not. There is also some evidence that student ability, as measured by SAT scores or grade point averages, is
negatively correlated with academic dishonesty (e.g., Abdolmohammadi and Baker, 2007).
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much more than outcomes, while Houser et al. (2012) nd that cheating following a dictator game
is higher when recipients report that they have been treated unfairly, but fail to uncover any link
between income and cheating at a later stage. Evidence from the eld also backs up the idea
that fairness perceptions inuence employee cheating: Greenberg (1990) nds that employee theft
increases when a pay cut in manufacturing plants is perceived as unfair; Nagin et al. (2002) nd
that call center workers who feel well treated cheat their employer less; while Chen and Sandino
(forthcoming) nd that employee theft decreases when wages rise relative to other comparable
retail stores.12
Although we believe that a plausible interpretation of our results relies on the perceived
fairness of the payment scheme, we should make clear that we have no direct evidence that the
subjects perceived exposure to the bonus-based compensation as unfair. Future work could ask
subjects directly at the end of the experiment about their perceptions of the fairness of the
payment scheme. It is also possible that fairness perceptions depend on how closely pay relates
to performance. A consequence would be that rms should aim to reduce the uncertainty in their
payment mechanisms and attempt to justify any uncertainty that remains.
Our result that more productive workers also cheat more might be viewed as surprising:
one might expect harder workers to be more honest as well. Indeed, Eisenberger and Shank
(1985) nd that subjects with a strong survey-measured work ethic resisted for longer before
taking an opportunity to cheat.13 On the other hand, people who are more strongly motivated
by money might work harder in order to earn more and be more inclined to take advantage of
opportunities to cheat for personal gain. Working hard on the real-eort task might also deplete
subjects' ability to withstand the temptation to cheat: Mead et al. (2009) and Gino et al. (2011)
nd that subjects whose self-control was depleted by being forced to undertake an onerous task
cheated more than subjects made to undertake a less onerous task. Another possibility is that the
subjects who worked harder felt that they deserved more for their labor. If the piece-rate wage
was felt to be insucient or unfairly low, this could have led to the more productive subjects
convincing themselves that more cheating was justied. Such perceptions of unfairness would
imply that low-wage or exploitative rms should be particulary wary of fraudulent behavior from
their higher-productivity workers.
1.4 Plan of the paper
Section 2 describes the experimental design. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and the
results. Section 4 concludes. Appendix A provides the experimental instructions. Appendix B
provides robustness checks. Appendix C provides some further statistics that are not in the main
text.
12See also Evans III et al. (2001), Zhang (2008) and Matuszewski (2010) for a link between fairness and honesty
in managerial reporting.
13Of course, since eort did not have social value, such measures of work ethic might not coincide with produc-
tivity in our experiment.
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2 Experimental design
We ran an online experiment during a two-week period in May 2011. To recruit subjects we sent
email announcements to students at the University of Southampton. During the two-week period,
641 subjects completed the experiment at a time and location of their choosing.14 The experiment
lasted 20 to 25 minutes and had to be completed in one go. The subjects were informed that they
would be paid $3 for completing the experiment, on top of any money that they earned during the
experiment (all payments were in pounds Sterling). The average total payment to the subjects
who completed the experiment was $19.32. At the end of the experiment, we asked the subjects
to report their gender. We paid the subjects privately in cash on two pre-advertised dates. The
experiment was implemented using the Django open-source web application framework, which is
written in Python. Appendix A provides the experimental instructions.
2.1 The slider task
We used the computerized real-eort `slider task', which was rst developed by Gill and Prowse
(2012).15 The slider task consists of a screen displaying a large number of sliders (as described
below, the number of sliders and the time allotted to the task varied across the stages of the
experiment). Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of a single slider. Each slider is initially
positioned at 0, as shown in Figure 1(a). By using her mouse or touchpad, the subject can
position each slider at any integer location between 0 and 100 inclusive.16 Each slider can be
readjusted an unlimited number of times during the time allotted to the task, and the current
position of each slider is displayed to the right of the slider. In this experiment, subjects received
2 points for each slider positioned at exactly 50 and 1 point for each slider positioned at exactly
49 or 51. Figure 1(b) shows a slider positioned at exactly 50, worth 2 points.
(a) Initial position. (b) Positioned at 50.
Figure 1: Schematic representation of a slider.
Figure 2 shows a screen of sliders as seen by the subjects. In this example, the subject has
positioned one slider at 50 and one at 49, giving a points score of 3. As the task proceeds, the
screen displays the subject's current points score and the amount of time remaining. The slider
task involves little randomness and the subject's points score gives a nely gradated measure of
performance or work output, which we term `productivity'.
14All those who expressed an interest were given log in details and were able to participate. 683 subjects logged
in, of which 42 failed to complete the experiment. Footnote 17 provides evidence that attrition was not related to
the allocation to the dierent experimental conditions.
15Gill and Prowse (2011b) provide details of how to implement the task, which has been used by Hetzel (2010),
Bonein and Denant-Boemont (2011), Cettolin and Riedl (2011), Eacret et al. (2011), Gill and Prowse (2011a),
Hammermann et al. (2011), Riener and Wiederhold (2011), Djawadi and Fahr (2012) and Monahan (2012).
16Keyboards were disabled to prevent the subjects from using the arrow keys to position the sliders.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of Stage 3.
Note: Not all the sliders are displayed: the subject can scroll down to see more sliders.
2.2 Stage 1: Practice
In the rst of the three stages, subjects were given two minutes to practice the slider task (with
102 sliders) and become familiar with it. This stage was not compensated.
2.3 Stage 2: Control and bonus treatment
In the second stage, subjects were given ten minutes to achieve a points score of 40 in the slider
task (again with 102 sliders). We chose a long time limit to give the subjects more than ample
time to achieve the required score, but subjects were aware that as soon as they reached a points
score of 40 they would move on to the third and nal stage and that if they did not achieve the
score they would exit the experiment. Our experimental conditions varied how the subjects were
compensated for completing the stage.
In the `Control' condition (C), the subjects were paid a xed pre-announced amount for
completing the stage. The control subjects were split into two subgroups: in `Control 1' (C1)
subjects were paid $2 for completing the stage; in `Control 2' (C2) subjects were paid $8 for
7
completing the stage. In the `Treatment' condition (T), subjects were told that they would be
paid $2 for completing the stage, and that there was a 50% chance they would earn a bonus
of an additional $6 for completing stage 2, in which case they would be paid a total of $8 for
completing the stage. The treated subjects were informed that a random number generator would
decide randomly whether or not they had earned the bonus, and that they would nd out the
outcome after completing the stage. `Treatment 1' (T1) refers to the subgroup of treated subjects
who did not receive the bonus, and who were thus paid $2 for completing the stage. `Treatment
2' (T2) refers to the subgroup of treated subjects who did receive the bonus, and who were thus
paid a total of $8 for completing the stage. Subjects were randomly allocated to C1, C2, T1 or
T2 with equal probability.17
To summarize, we have a 2 ($2 or $8)  2 (xed payment or bonus) between-subjects design.
In C1 the subjects earned $2 for sure. In C2 they earned $8 for sure. In T1 they earned $2,
but failed to receive a random bonus of $6. In T2 they earned $8, including a random bonus of
$6. The design allows us to identify the causal eects of the random bonus: in Section 3.1 we
look at the causal eect of the bonus treatment on later cheating and productivity in stage 3,
holding remuneration constant; in Section 3.2 we look at the causal eect of receiving the bonus
on cheating and productivity.
2.4 Stage 3: Cheating and productivity
The third stage is designed to measure cheating and productivity. Subjects were given ve minutes
to work on the slider task (now with 201 sliders), and were paid $0.05 for every point they scored.
In addition, we asked the subjects to report the last digit of their best friend's phone number and
told them that they would be paid an amount in pounds equal to the number that they reported
(we also gave them the option of reporting \don't know", which paid nothing). The subjects were
informed that they could report the number at any time during the ve minutes, that they could
change their report if they made a mistake, and that the report at the end of the ve minutes
would determine payos.18 Figure 2 provides a screenshot of this stage.
Asking the subjects to report the last digit of their best friend's number introduces an oppor-
tunity for the subjects to cheat. By reporting a value higher than the true one, the subjects could
raise their payo without any possibility of detection. As discussed in Section 1.2, this aspect
of the experimental design provides opportunities for both `soft' and `hard' cheating, and in so
doing mimics the nature of many real-world cheating opportunities. Although we do not know
17When subjects logged in to start the experiment, they were randomly allocated to C1, C2 or T, with 25%
probability, 25% probability and 50% probability respectively. After completing stage 2, the subjects in T were
randomly allocated to T1 or T2 with equal probability. Of the 641 subjects who completed the experiment, 152
were in C1, 183 in C2, 164 in T1 and 142 in T2. Of the 42 subjects who logged in but failed to complete the
experiment, 11 dropped out during the practice stage before they were given any information about their payment
scheme. Of the 31 who dropped out after the practice stage, 7 were in C1, 6 in C2 and 18 in T (16 of the 18 dropped
out before discovering whether they had earned the bonus or not). The attrition rate in T was not signicantly
dierent to that in C (a t-test gives a 2-sided p = 0:265 for the null that the attrition rates were the same), and
within C the attrition rate in C1 was not signicantly dierent to that in C2 (2-sided p = 0:554).
18We did not separate the cheating decision from the work decision to reect real-world work environments in
which workers face simultaneous work and cheating incentives.
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the exact distribution of the last digit of people's phone numbers, we can compare the average
number reported by subjects who were in dierent control and treatment conditions in stage 2 to
detect dierences in cheating. Given the subjects have no compelling incentive to underreport,
any increase in the average report can reasonably be interpreted as an increase in cheating.19
3 Results
We split our analysis into three parts. First, we look at the causal eect of the bonus treatment
on later cheating and productivity. Second, we consider the causal eect of being paid a random
bonus on cheating and productivity. Finally, we see whether there is a relationship between
cheating and productivity in stage 3.
3.1 Eect of bonus treatment on cheating and productivity
In this section, we want to discover whether subjects exposed to the random bonus treatment T
change their behavior, compared to subjects in the control C. Recall that the comparison holds
remuneration constant, as subjects in C1 are paid the same as in T1 ($2) while those in C2 are
paid the same as in T2 ($8). To identify the causal eect of using random bonuses in stage 2
on cheating and productivity in stage 3, we regress three outcomes of interest on a dummy for
the bonus treatment, namely: (i) the report of the last digit of each subject's best friend's phone
number; (ii) an indicator of the report being greater than or equal to 7; and (iii) each subject's
points score in the slider task. In each case, we run the regression with and without a male
control.
Table 1 shows that the bonus treatment induces more cheating but has no eect on pro-
ductivity: subjects who have been exposed to the bonus treatment report signicantly higher
numbers on average (columns 1-2; 2-sided p = 0:057 with a male control) and are signicantly
more likely to report a number greater than or equal to 7 (columns 3-4; 2-sided p = 0:045 with a
male control), but do not work signicantly harder (columns 5-6; 2-sided p = 0:967 with a male
control). Using random bonuses increases the average report by 5% and increases the proportion
of subjects reporting a 7 or higher by 9%, but the increase in the average points score is less than
0.1% and not signicant.20;21 Given the large estimated magnitude of cheating in the workplace
and its implications for businesses (See Section 1.2), the increase in cheating that we nd from
19It is possible that some subjects underreported high numbers in order to avoid any suspicion of cheating. In
common with experiments which identify cheating using reports of random outcomes such as coin ips or die rolls
where the underlying distribution is known, we cannot identify such behavior, but we nd it unlikely that it played
an important role in our experiment.
20Other papers have found that productivity in the slider task can be inuenced by a variety of factors, including
the size of the incentives and the productivity of the rst-mover in a sequential tournament (Gill and Prowse, 2012),
and by whether a subject won or lost in a previous round with repeated competition (Gill and Prowse, 2011a).
21The impact of the bonus treatment on cheating does not depend on whether subjects were paid $2 (C1 and
T1) or $8 (C2 and T2). When we run the regressions in columns 1-4 of Table 1 for subjects in C1 and T1 only
or for subjects in C2 and T2 only, the coecients on the treatment dummy are positive in both cases, and do not
vary signicantly when comparing that for C1 and T1 subjects to that for T2 and C2 subjects (p-values of 0.703,
0.524, 0.882 and 0.916 for columns 1-4, respectively).
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using random bonuses, if translated to real-world settings, is economically signicant.22 In the
light of evidence that rms often use bonus-based compensation that includes an important ran-
dom component (see Section 1.2), this suggests that rms ought to take into account possible
unintended consequences for worker honesty when designing bonus-based pay structures.
Reported Proportion of Points score in
number reports  7 slider task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.353 0.362 0.068 0.069 0.060 0.068
(T) [0.192] [0.190] [0.035] [0.035] [1.663] [1.642]
(0.066) (0.057) (0.052) (0.045) (0.971) (0.967)
Male - 0.537 - 0.100 - 6.980
- [0.195] - [0.035] - [1.640]
- (0.006) - (0.005) - (0.000)
Intercept 7.324 7.022 0.739 0.682 89.457 85.645
[0.141] [0.181] [0.025] [0.034] [1.216] [1.424]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 582 582 582 582 641 641
Notes: (i) , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are in parentheses. (ii) We weight the data to allow
for the fact that the ratio of subjects in C1 to C2 is not exactly the same as the ratio of subjects in T1 to T2
(see footnote 17). Table 4 in Appendix B shows that our results are robust to using the unweighted data.
(iii) The rst four columns include only the 582 subjects who reported a number. Table 5 in Appendix B
shows that our results are robust to including all 641 subjects who completed the experiment, and so using
money earned from the report as the dependent variable rather than the report itself. The eects are
slightly larger in magnitude, but not quite as precisely estimated. (iv) The results in columns (3) and (4)
are robust to running Probit or Logit regressions. (v) When we add a male-treatment interaction term
to the specication in column 2, the coecient on this additional term is not signicantly dierent from
zero. (vi) A Mann-Whitney test indicates that the distribution of the reported number for the control C
is statistically dierent from that for the random bonus treatment T (2-sided p = 0:086).
Table 1: Eect of bonus treatment: OLS regressions.
We can see visually the impact of the bonus treatment on cheating by inspecting the probabil-
ity and cumulative distributions of the reported number in Figure 3. Figure 3(b) illustrates that
the cumulative distribution of the reported number for subjects who have been exposed to the
bonus treatment rst-order stochastically dominates that for subjects exposed to the control. In
Figure 3(a) we can see that about 55% of the subjects report 9, the number that maximizes earn-
ings: a high but incomplete rate of cheating is consistent with the existing evidence on cheating
more broadly (e.g., Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008). Our nding that males cheat more (positive
22If we assume that last digits are distributed uniformly, then the increase in the reported number of 5%
(0.353/7.324) corresponds to an increase in the amount by which subjects cheat on average of 13% (0.353/(7.324 -
4.500)).
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coecients on the male dummy in columns 2 and 4 of Table 1, signicant at the 1% level) also
matches previous ndings (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Conrads et al., 2013; Houser et al.,
2012).
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Figure 3: Eect of bonus treatment on distribution of reported number.
Notes: The distributions are for the 582 subjects who reported a number. The data are weighted
as explained in the notes to Table 1.
3.2 Eect of receiving bonus on cheating and productivity
Next, we focus on the causal eect of receiving the random bonus on cheating and productivity. In
Section 3.1, we looked at whether subjects exposed to the bonus treatment change their behavior,
compared to the control subjects. Here we want to discover, within the subjects exposed to the
bonus treatment in stage 2, whether those who received the random bonus (T2) change their
behavior in stage 3 compared to those who did not receive the bonus (T1).
Table 2 replicates the analysis of Table 1, but using only the subjects exposed to the bonus
treatment and using the receipt of the random bonus (T2) as the treatment dummy. The results
show that receiving the bonus has no statistically signicant eect on either cheating or produc-
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tivity. Receiving the bonus has a small positive eect on the average number reported, a small
negative eect on the proportion of subjects reporting a 7 or higher, and a small positive eect on
the average points score in the slider task, but none of the eects are close to being signicant.23
The probability and cumulative distributions of the reported number in Figure 4 conrm visually
the absence of any eect of receiving the bonus on cheating.
Reported Proportion of Points score in
number reports  7 slider task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Received bonus 0.070 0.098 -0.022 -0.018 2.499 2.615
(T2) [0.259] [0.257] [0.048] [0.047] [2.267] [2.237]
(0.787) (0.703) (0.642) (0.705) (0.271) (0.243)
Male - 0.620 - 0.093 - 5.872
- [0.264] - [0.048] - [2.244]
- (0.020) - (0.054) - (0.009)
Intercept 7.642 7.290 0.818 0.765 88.268 85.010
[0.188] [0.252] [0.032] [0.045] [1.648] [1.898]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 280 280 280 280 306 306
Notes: (i) , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are in parentheses. (ii) The rst four columns
include only the 280 subjects exposed to the bonus treatment T who reported a number, while the nal
two include all 306 subjects exposed to T. (iii) The results in columns (3) and (4) are robust to running
Probit or Logit regressions.
Table 2: Eect of receiving bonus: OLS regressions.
23We also nd that income does not aect cheating when we compare the behavior of all the subjects who earned
$2 (C1 and T1) to those who earned $8 (C2 and T2) and when comparing those who earned $2 in the Control
(C1) to those who earned $8 in the Control (C2).
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Figure 4: Eect of receiving bonus on distribution of reported number.
Note: The distributions are for the 280 subjects exposed to the bonus treatment T who reported
a number.
In summary, the results presented above in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 reveal that the level of
cheating depends on whether subjects were exposed to the bonus treatment, but not on whether
they actually received the bonus. As discussed in Section 1.3, drawing on notions of procedural
fairness and existing empirical evidence, a plausible interpretation is that subjects judge the
random aspect of the bonus in the Treatment to be unjust, and reciprocate negatively in the
form of more dishonesty.
3.3 Relationship between cheating and productivity
Finally, we want to see whether cheating and productivity in stage 3 are related. As discussed
in Section 1.3, the direction of any relationship between cheating and productivity is an open
question. However, this relationship is of critical importance to employers when designing work-
place institutions and employee monitoring schemes. To look at the relationship, we regress (i)
the report of the last digit of each subject's best friend's phone number and (ii) an indicator
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of the report being greater than or equal to 7 on each subject's points score in the slider task.
Once again, we run the regressions with and without a male control. Table 3 shows that the
more productive subjects also cheat more: a higher points score is positively associated with the
reported number (columns 1-2; 2-sided p = 0:050 with a male control) and the probability that a
subject reports a number greater than or equal to 7 (columns 3-4; 2-sided p = 0:059 with a male
control). The regression coecients imply that, on average, moving from the lowest points score
of 32 to the highest points score of 159 is associated with an increase in the report of 22% and
an increase in the probability of a subject reporting a 7 or higher of 43%.24
Reported Probability of
number report  7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Points score in 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.002
slider task [0.005] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001]
(0.017) (0.050) (0.019) (0.059)
Male - 0.461 - 0.086
- [0.200] - [0.036]
- (0.022) - (0.019)
Intercept 6.486 6.393 0.593 0.576
[0.446] [0.444] [0.080] [0.080]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 582 582 582 582
Notes: (i) , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are in parentheses. (ii) We include only the 582
subjects who reported a number. Table 6 in Appendix B shows that our results are robust to including all
641 subjects who completed the experiment, and so using money earned from the report as the dependent
variable rather than the report itself. The eects are slightly larger in magnitude, but not quite as precisely
estimated. (iii) The results in columns (3) and (4) are robust to running Probit or Logit regressions.
Table 3: Relationship between cheating and productivity: OLS regressions.
Our result that more productive workers cheat more is consistent with people who are more
strongly motivated by money working harder in order to earn more and also being more tempted
to cheat for personal gain. The result may also reect that subjects' self-control is eroded by
working on the real-eort task. Alternatively, hard-working subjects may have felt that they
deserved more for their labor. Further discussion of these mechanisms can be found in Section 1.3.
24The relationship between cheating and productivity does not depend on whether subjects were exposed to the
bonus treatment (T) or the control (C), and nor does the relationship depend on whether subjects were paid $2
(C1 and T1) or $8 (C2 and T2). When we run the regressions in Table 3 for subjects in C only or for subjects in
T only, the coecients on the points score are positive in all cases, and do not vary signicantly when comparing
that for C subjects to that for T subjects (p-values of 0.267, 0.260, 0.294 and 0.291 for columns 1-4, respectively).
When we run the regressions for subjects in C1 and T1 only or for subjects in C2 and T2 only, the coecients on
the points score are positive in all cases, and do not vary signicantly when comparing that for C1 and T1 subjects
to that for T2 and C2 subjects (p-values of 0.740, 0.670, 0.281, and 0.241 for columns 1-4, respectively).
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4 Conclusion
Despite their importance, employee cheating and crime have received insucient attention by
economists. Our analysis contributes to a burgeoning literature that examines the interaction
between compensation schemes and cheating in the workplace, and we are the rst to investigate
a link between productivity and dishonesty. Our ndings are consistent with workers perceiving
exposure to random bonuses as unfair, providing a justication for negative reciprocity in the
form of increased cheating. Thus, bonus-based compensation may have important unintended
side-eects that have not been highlighted suciently in the existing literature, which has instead
focused mainly on the incentive eects of bonuses.25 Complementary eld evidence and replication
of our novel experimental ndings in laboratory studies would be of particular value to determine
the degree to which our results extend to dierent work tasks and to bonus schemes used in
practice.
25There is a literature examining the eects of bonus-like schemes on undesirable behavior. For instance, Gubler
et al. (2013) nd that employee award programs can have unanticipated eects on productivity, Jensen (2001) and
Jensen (2003) nd that targets can make managers dishonest in formulating budgets, Larkin (forthcoming) nds
that commission-based pay can aect pricing, while Ordonez et al. (2009a) and Ordonez et al. (2009b) nd that
goals can induce a number of unintended consequences including unethical behavior.
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Appendix
A Experimental instructions
Log In
You are being asked to take part in an experiment on economic decision-making. The experiment
will last about 20 to 25 minutes. We are very grateful for your participation. You will be paid
a participation fee of $3 for completing the experiment. You will also have the opportunity to
earn additional money. Your earnings today will depend on your own actions and some element
of chance. Further details will be provided during the experiment. You will be able to come
to Room 3115 in Building 58 (Murray Building - Higheld Campus) between 9am and 6pm on
Thursday 26 May or Wednesday 1 June to collect your payment for the experiment. You will
be paid in cash. If you cannot come on one of these days, please do not participate. Please
complete the experiment on a desktop or laptop computer. Tablet computers, iPads, iPhones
etc. will not work properly. You must not press any of your browser buttons (e.g., stop, refresh,
reload, back, forward) at any time. If you do so, you will exit the experiment and you will not
be paid anything. Please do not use your keyboard: use only your mouse or touchpad. Once
you log in to start the experiment, you must complete it in one go. If you leave the experiment,
you cannot return and you will not be paid anything. You have the right to withdraw from the
experiment at any time. If you withdraw from the experiment, you will not be paid anything. If
you have a technical problem during the experiment please contact: jy2e08@ecs.soton.ac.uk. If
you have forgotten your password, or for any other query, please contact: jy2e08@ecs.soton.ac.uk.
If you wish to participate now, please enter your username and password below. [Box to enter
previously provided username and password] Note, if you have trouble logging in using Firefox,
please follow the troubleshoot [Web link]. Alternatively, you can use the Google Chrome browser
or use a computer in the computing room at the Hartley Library.
Instructions - General Overview
You must not press any of your browser buttons (e.g., stop, refresh, reload, back, forward) at
any time. If you do so, you will exit the experiment and you will not be paid anything. Please
do not use your keyboard: use only your mouse or touchpad. The experiment will consist of 3
stages. At the start of each stage, you will receive instructions about that stage. What you do
in stage 1 will not aect what happens in stages 2 and 3, and what you do in stage 2 will not
aect what happens in stage 3. As is the case in all economics experiments, we will not deceive
you in any way during the experiment. In particular, this means that we will not give you any
false information at any time during the experiment. [\Proceed" button] Button will enable in
50 seconds. Once the button is enabled, please press it to proceed when you are ready.
Instructions - The Task
In each stage you will have the opportunity to attempt a computerised task. The task will consist
of a screen with a large number of sliders. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and can be moved
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as far as 100. Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position. You can use
your mouse or touchpad in any way you like to move each slider. You can readjust the position
of each slider as many times as you wish. All the sliders will be on one page, but you may need
to scroll down the page to see them all. You will receive 2 points for each slider that you position
at exactly 50. You will receive 1 point for each slider that you position at exactly 49 or 51. Your
\points score" in the task will be your total number of points. During the task, a number of
pieces of information will appear at the top of your screen, including the time remaining and your
points score in the task so far. [\Proceed" button] Button will enable in 90 seconds
Stage 1 out of 3: Instructions
In stage 1 you will have 2 minutes to practice the task. The purpose of this stage is purely to
allow you to practice the task. Therefore, you will not be paid for this stage. [\Start Practice"
button] Button will enable in 20 seconds
Stage 2 out of 3: Instructions
To complete stage 2 you must reach a points score of 40 in the task within 10 minutes. As soon
as you reach a points score of 40 you will proceed immediately to the next screen. fC1: You
will be paid $2 for completing stage 2.g fC2: You will be paid $8 for completing stage 2.g fT1
and T2: You will be paid $2 for completing stage 2. There is also a 50% chance that you will
earn a bonus of an additional $6 for completing stage 2. If you earn the bonus, you will thus be
paid a total of $8 = $2 + $6 for completing the stage. A computer will use a random number
generator to decide randomly whether or not you have earned the bonus for completing stage 2.
You will nd out whether you have earned the bonus only after completing the stage.g If you fail
to complete stage 2 within 10 minutes you will leave the experiment automatically and you will
not be paid anything. [\Start Stage 2" button] Button will enable in 90 seconds
Stage 2 out of 3: Summary of payment
fC1: Your payment for completing stage 2 is $2.g fC2: Your payment for completing stage
2 is $8.g fT1: Remember that there was a 50% chance that you would earn a bonus of $6 for
completing stage 2. You did not earn the bonus. Your payment for completing stage 2 is $2.gfT2:
Remember that there was a 50% chance that you would earn a bonus of $6 for completing stage
2. You did earn the bonus. Your payment for completing stage 2 is $8.g [\Proceed" button]
Button will enable in 45 seconds
Stage 3 out of 3: Instructions
In stage 3 you will have the opportunity to attempt the task for a period of 5 minutes. You will
be paid according to your points score at the end of the 5 minutes. In particular, you will be
paid 5 pence for every point you score. You will also be asked to report the last digit of your
best friend's phone number, i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9. In addition to the payment for your
points score in the task, you will be paid an amount in pounds equal to the number that you
report. Therefore, for every increase of 1 in the number that you report, your payment for stage
3 will go up by $1. You can report the last digit of your best friend's phone number at any time
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during the 5 minutes for this stage. If you make a mistake, you can change your report during
the 5 minutes. At the end of the 5 minutes your report will be nal. If you do not know or cannot
nd your best friend's phone number, please select the \don't know" option. Your payment for
stage 3 will then depend only on your points score in the task. [\Start Stage 3" button] Button
will enable in 90 seconds
B Robustness
We collect here three tables that are referred to in the notes to Tables 1 and 3 as providing
robustness checks.
Reported Proportion of Points score in
number reports  7 slider task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.354 0.364 0.069 0.071 -0.160 -0.114
(T) [0.192] [0.191] [0.035] [0.034] [1.667] [1.645]
(0.066) (0.057) (0.048) (0.041) (0.924) (0.945)
Male - 0.535 - 0.099 - 7.031
- [0.195] - [0.035] - [1.638]
- (0.006) - (0.005) - (0.000)
Intercept 7.321 7.018 0.738 0.682 89.588 85.706
[0.141] [0.180] [0.025] [0.034] [1.214] [1.418]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 582 582 582 582 641 641
Notes: All results are from OLS regressions. , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are in
parentheses.
Table 4: Robustness (Table 1): unweighted data.
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Earnings from Proportion of earnings
report (in pounds) from report  $7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.413 0.414 0.071 0.071
(T) [0.243] [0.242] [0.036] [0.036]
(0.089) (0.087) (0.050) (0.049)
Male - 0.682 - 0.111
- [0.245] - [0.036]
- (0.006) - (0.003)
Intercept 6.619 6.247 0.668 0.607
[0.174] [0.226] [0.026] [0.034]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 641 641 641 641
Notes: (i) All results are from OLS regressions. , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are in
parentheses. (ii) Since we include the subjects who did not report a number, the dependent variable is
money earned from the report rather than the report itself.
Table 5: Robustness (columns 1-4 of Table 1): all 641 subjects.
Earnings from Probability of earnings
report (in pounds) from report  $7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Points score in 0.012 0.010 0.002 0.002
slider task [0.006] [0.006] [0.001] [0.001]
(0.035) (0.093) (0.020) (0.064)
Male - 0.614 - 0.098
- [0.252] - [0.037]
- (0.015) - (0.009)
Intercept 5.684 5.561 0.518 0.498
[0.554] [0.551] [0.081] [0.081]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 641 641 641 641
Notes: (i) All results are from OLS regressions. , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are in
parentheses. (ii) Since we include the subjects who did not report a number, the dependent variable is
money earned from the report rather than the report itself.
Table 6: Robustness (Table 3): all 641 subjects.
19
C Further statistics
This Appendix contains additional summary statistics as well as the cumulative distributions of
the reported number for C1 and C2 not provided in the main text.
Treatment Number of Points score Reported Proportion of
subjects in slider task number reports  7
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Control 1 (C1) 141 88.1 (21.6) 7.36 (2.4) 0.74
Control 2 (C2) 161 91.1 (22.1) 7.29 (2.5) 0.73
Treatment 1 (T1) 148 88.2 (21.3) 7.64 (2.3) 0.82
Treatment 2 (T2) 132 91.2 (18.9) 7.71 (2.1) 0.80
Notes: The data are for the 582 subjects who reported a number. Standard deviations (SD) are in
parentheses.
Table 7: Additional summary statistics.
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution function in Control 1 (C1) and in Control 2 (C2).
Note: The distributions are for the 302 subjects exposed to the control C who reported a number.
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